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Abstract 
A WORK IN PROGRESS: 
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CHARTER'S 
EQUATION OF RIGHTS AND LIMITS 
B. Jamie Cameron 
The text of the Charter separates the rights conferred from reasonable limits which may justifiably be 
placed on their enjoyment. Though the concepts of breach and justification serve different functions, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has not been faithful to the Charter's structural logic. "A Work in Progess" 
examines the relationship between the rights and their limits in the jurisprudence. It shows that the 
boundary between breach and justification bas been blurred, and that the Court's methodology is complex 
and unworkable. The final section suggests a methodology which will enable these concepts to serve their 
respective functions without upsetting the balance in the Charter's equation of rights and limits. 
A work in progress 
In the early flush of Charter1 interpretation the Supreme Court of Canada's jurisprudence was influenced 
by two assumptions. First, the judges considered section l an innovation which marked Canada's text for 
the protection of constitutional rights an improvement over the U.S. model. Second, the Court believed 
that a structured methodology would advance the enjoyment of rights. A structured approach could help 
fulfill the Charter's promise and assist in maintaining the vital distinction between matters of law and 
matters of politics. 
The fallibility of these assumptions has become evident over the years. Section l, which, along with 
section 33, is often touted as a distinguishing feature of the Charter, has been a mixed blessing. By 
separating the concepts of breach and justification, the text set up an equation with two sides rather than 
one. In place of any presumption in favour of the entitlement, Canada's model sought equilibrium 
between individual rights and the demands of democratic governance. If section l' s mandate of 
reasonable limits allayed fears of absolute rights and the Charter's implications for parliamentary 
tradition, it has confounded the Court nonetheless. 
To this day the Supreme Court remains baffled by Lhe textual equation of rights and limits. Under some 
guarantees, such as section 2(b)'s freedom of expression, the threshold for breach is low, and limits are 
imposed almost exclusively under section 1. Meanwhile, though the Court's definition of entitlement 
imposes significant constraints on the scope of section 15, the judges cannot agree on the analytical 
division of labour between breach and justification. Finally, freedom of association has been given a 
narrow and defensive interpretation quite unlike that accorded section 2(b). 
Text and context confirm that the plan was for limits on the Charter's rights and freedoms to be 
rationalized and imposed under section 1. That is the functional logic of reasonable limits, and yet it is a 
logic the Court has resisted. Due to differing views about how such limits qualify the guarantees and 
affect the scope of the entitlement, section l has never played its intended role. The Court has rejected its 
logic but failed to explain why the relationship between rights and their limits varies so much from one 
guarantee to another. 
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Co11stir11tion Act, 1982 being Schedule B to U1e Canada Act 1982 
(U.K.), c. l I [hereinafter <;harrer]. 
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Divergent methodologies are one source of confusion in the Cowt's Charter interpretation, but there is 
another. Initially, and largely under the stewardship of the late Chief Justice Dickson, the Court sought 
refuge from the unfamiliar task of enforcing constitutional rights in structured doctrines. The Oakes2 test, 
which promulgated a series of tests to evaluate the question of reasonable limits, is a case in point. There 
are others too, including Irwin Toy' s3 abortive two-step-test under section 2(b), the section 15's Law4 
methodology, and even Professional Jnstitute's5 four part definition of associational freedom. 
Under the burden of layered and overlapping criteria, Charter analysis has become less accessible, to the 
point at times of impenetrable. For instance, the question of breach under section 15 is answered by a 
multi-step test, which incorporates subdivisions and further guidelines. That side of the equation is then 
followed by the several parts of the Oakes test, which is applied to determine whether limits are 
justifiable. Yet witb prolix, cumulative doctrines the probability that the boundaries between breach and 
justification will blur can only increase. In addition, to escape the needless convolution of such doctrines, 
the Court has inserted subjective criteria into the mix. Co-existing alongside abstract doctrines in the 
jurisprudence are perceptive concepts like context, vulnerability, and human dignity. More often than not, 
those considerations, and not the evenhanded application of a structured methodology, determine the 
outcome. To summarize, the Court claims adherence to a structured methodology and then employs 
result-oriented criteria to decide cases. Charter adjudication does not take place under a methodology but 
rather, under the cover of methodology. 
This paper's goals are to explain the evolution of Charter methodology in more detail, and then to 
propose an alternative which respects the functions of breach and justification, as well as the principle of 
equilibrium between the two. The proposal rests on two premises. The first is that limits on the Charter's 
rights and freedoms should not enter the definition of entitlement and should be reserved to the question 
of justification under section l. Second, and with a few exceptions, the Charter' s methodology should not 
be individualized to particular guarantees, but generalized to section I and its mandate of identifying 
reasonable limits. 
Like the Court's Charter methodology, this paper is, at the time of publication, a work in progress. The 
polished version will develop the arguments introduced here and provide the support for its proposal that 
is not included here. In the circumstances, comments are particularly welcome. 
Tlie structural dilemma 
At the outset, the Cou1t' s aspirations for the Charter outstripped its grasp of the equation's implications. 
Having been castigated for its uninspired interpretation of the Canadian Bill of Rights,6 the judges were 
motivated to make amends and demonstrate diligence in undertaking responsibility·for the enforcement of 
constitutional rights. As a result, rights were initially favoured on both sides of the equation. Thus in R. v. 
Big M Drug Mart, 1 the Comt declared that the Charter' s guarantees should receive a generous and 
purposive interpretation. Despite the reference to "purposive", which later served to qualify the meaning 
of "generous", Dickson J. ' s opinion in Big M confirmed that the Court would secure for individuals the 
full benefit of the Charter's protection. He did add an admonition, in suggesting an approach to 
entitlement, against overshooting the mark. 
2 R. v. Oakes, [1986] I S.C.R. 103. 
3 h,Yin foy v. Quebec (A.G.), l1989] I S.C.R. 927. 
~ Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration}, [1999] I S.C.R. 497. 
5 Professional Institute of the Public Service a/ Canada v. Northern Territories (Commissioner), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367. 
6 Canadian Bill of Rig hts, S.C. 1960, c.44. 
7 [1985] I S.C.R. 295. 
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In the spirit of the day, the Supreme Court also announced, under section 1, that rights are the rule and 
limits the exception. That principle was formal ized in the Oakes test, which promulgated a structured and 
rights-protective standard of justification.8 It is in the nature of equations, though, that each side affects 
the other. That is why slanting both sides of the Charter's equation in a rights-protective direction placed 
its equilibrium at risk. Not letting up on the Oakes test under section 1, in combination with Big Ms 
generous approach to the definition of rights, made it difficult for limits to prevail . By the same token, 
unless the entitlements themselves were limited, the burden of balancing the equation would fall entirely 
on section l. 
Together, Big Mand Oakes could radically alter the relationship between individuals and the state, as 
well as compromise friendly relations between courts and legislatures. If re-jigging the concepts of breach 
and justification was unavoidable, still the Court had choices in deciding bow to find the Charter's point 
of equilibrium. For instance, either or both sides of the equation could be modified. Yet in choosing to 
alter both, the Court all but abandoned the functional distinction between the entitlement and its 
permissible limits. 
Skewing the equatio11 
Joining Big Mand Oakes differed little in effect from a model of absolute rights. In such circumstances, 
including section l's general principle of reasonable limits, modifying the Oakes test would have been the 
easiest way to correct the imbalance. That solution bad the advantage of respecting the text's separation 
of breach and j ustification. It was unacceptable just the same, because the Charter's structural logic 
contained a contradiction. Setting 1 imits exclusively under section l would not avoid the awkwardness of 
absolute rights, because it suggested that the entitlements were unlimited. Against a tradition of 
parliamentary democracy, it was asking too much for courts to grant individual rights an unbounded 
interpretation, even if only temporarily and on one side of the equation. 
Moreover, by setting one part of the analysi~ off from the other, the Charter's structure promoted 
analytical imbalance. A low threshold on the question of breach, which then shifted attention to section 1, 
placed a disproportionate burden on the justification exercise. Though there is no logical reason why a 
"balance" between rights and limits cannot be achieved under that model, the concepts of individual 
entitlement and democratic limits would appear distorted. Finally, a methodology that sent every limit to 
section l would disadvantage the government, and make the rights holder a favorite of the law. Rather 
than adjust the justification side of the equation, the Court tinkered with both. 
Definitional limits 011 the entitleme11t 
This paper maintains that definitional restrictions on the scope of a right are a form of justifiable limits in 
disguise. To the contrary, though, Charter analysis assumes that an entitlement must be defined before 
violations can be debated as pennissible or impermissible. In other words, the government can only be 
asked to explain a limit on a right that bas content or meaning. If it appears that disagreement on this 
point is simply a debate about the definition of a definition, an example from American jurisprudence can 
explain why categorical limits are unworkable. Years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court held that lewd, 
obscene and libelous speech was excluded from the First Amendment9. As each is in fact a form of 
speech, the Court was trapped in a contradiction. These categories were removed from the Constitution in 
any event, because the expressive activities were not speech in a different sense. At the time, each was 
viewed as being so valueless, having regard to the First Amendment's underlying rationales, that it was 
permissible to eliminate it from constitutional consideration. 
8 Supra note 2. 
9 Chaplinskyv. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
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The subsequent jurisprudence would show, however, that definitional exclusion was an exercise in 
futility, for the U.S. Supreme Court could not avoid drawing the line between the obscene and non-
obscene, and so on. Though abstracted in the form of a definition, there was a line that distinguished 
between speech which was included and speech which was excluded. For purposes of this paper, the point 
is that the U.S. Bill of Rights has no equivalent of section 1, and the American Court is without a textual 
mandate to limit individual rights. Under the Charter, Canada's courts could avoid the contradiction that 
obscenity is not expression, or that different treatment is not unequal treatment, because reasonable 
explanations could be advanced and limits accepted under section l . 
By upholding statutory limits on obscenity and other categories of offensive expression, the Supreme 
Court of Canada achieved a similar result under section l. Elsewhere, however, it obviated the need for a 
justification analysis by interpreting the entitlement restrictively. Under section 15, for example, the 
Court fretted that a generous definition of equality would upset the balance of breach and justification. As 
a result, Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia10 confined the guarantee to its named grounds of 
discrimination, and to others which qualified as analogous. Building flexibility into section 15's 
interpretation by adding analogous grounds avoided "freezing" the Charter's concept of equality. Even 
so, the text was clear that the guarantee was intended, by its comprehensive terms, to protect the equality 
of all individuals. 
As noted above, the Court's approach in Andrews sought analytical balance between the concepts of 
breach and justification. From that perspective, while too generous an interpretation of section 15 would 
overtax section l, an uncharitable definition would shortchange the concept of equality. If a midway point 
between two extremes appeared sensible it nonetheless blurred the distinction between the Charter's two 
functions. To explain, the prohibited grounds methodology treats certain characteristics as a proxy for the 
discrimination that has been practiced on individuals, not as a matter of their merit, but because they bear 
certain characteristics in common with others. By the same token, this methodology has a negative aspect, 
which discounts different treatment, unless it is accompanied by one of the prohibited grounds. In that 
setting, individuals who are not treated equally suffer a discrimination in one sense but not in the sense of 
the entitlement. The reasoning of Andrews is longhand for the conclusion that an inequality that does not 
fall within the categories which have constitutional status is one that is justifiable. Without being put to 
the test under section 1, such inequalities are by definition reasonable, permissible and justifiable. In this, 
the negative definition of section 15 is no different than the U.S. Supreme Court' s conclusion that 
fighting words, obscenity and libel are not speech under the First Amendment. 
Through the prohibited grounds methodology, justificatory criteria entered the Court's interpretation of 
equality. Nor could the Court resist the temptation, subsequently, to expand on section 15's definitional 
limits. Andrews left unresolved whether a classification based on prohibited grounds would establish a 
breach, or whether section 15 required proof, in addition, that the classification was discriminatory. The 
possibility that the prohibited grounds might not suffice created new opportunities for section l's function 
to invade section 15. The most transparent example will be found in the La Forest-Gonthier methodology 
of Egan v. Canada 11 and Miron v. Trudel. 12 There, in separate opinions, the judges claimed, respectively, 
that classifications based on a prohibited ground are only discriminatory when based on an irrelevant 
personal characteristic. In other words, a characteristic which is irrelevant is unreasonable as a basis for 
classification and therefore in breach of section 15, but one that is relevant is not. Different treatment 
grounded in a relevant personal characteristic would not violate section 15, under this analysis, because it 
is, by definition, reasonable and justifiable. 
to (1989) l S.C.R. 143. 
11 [1995) 2 S.C.R. 513. 
12 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418. 
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Though other members of the Court rejected that approach, their reliance on stereotyping as the test of 
discrimination was more subtle but little different. That view equated treatment which stereotyped 
individuals with discrimination but again, it is in effect a section 1 conclusion reformulated to fit the 
entitlement analysis. If the presence of stereotyping is prima facie discriminatory, or impermissible, its 
absence simply means that an equality based on a prohibited ground is justifiable after all. 
Between Andrews and the decision in Law v. Canada,13 the Supreme Court judges attempted to plot a 
course for the equality jurisprudence. What emerged in that ten year period, however, was an inchoate 
mass of principles, tests, and methodologies. Its members finally agreed on a definition for section 15 
when Iacobucci J. cobbled a synthesis of the Court's ruminations on equality which is now known as the 
Law test. Its aim, which was to state a comprehensive definition of equality, reveals a misconception of 
the entitlement side of the equation. Enumerating a cumulative and encyclopedic list of all that equality 
can or might mean is a distraction from the task of the analysis, which is to determine whether there is a 
primafacie breach that requires justification under section I. 
In terms of this paper's interest in the relationship between rights and their limits, the Law methodology is 
flawed for two reasons. First, its criteria are long-winded, intertwined, abstract and yet, as the Court 
cautioned, not exhaustive at that. In the circumstances, the excesses of the breach analysis have prompted 
judges to simplify the exercise. Law offers a shortcut, which is to ask, fundamentally, whether the 
different treatment at issue violates an individual's "essential human dignity". Unfortunately, human 
dignity is a concept that is perceptive rather than concrete and, by subdividing it into subjective and 
objective components, Law magnified its fluidity and indeterminacy. As well, Law has confirmed that 
adding layers upon layers of doctrinal criteria does not lend precision to the decision making process. The 
debate between Justices Bastarache and Arbour in Lavoie v. Canada14 shows that the Law methodology, 
with its plethora of elements leading to the human dignity shortcut, results in the opposite. 
Second, by resorting to human dignity as the standard of discrimination, the Court relied again on 
justificatory thinking to define the entitlement. In Lavoie for example, Arbour J. maintained that a 
citizenship preference in employment was not discriminatory because a reasonable person's human 
dignity would not be offended in such circumstances. Such reasoning, however, is a version of 
justification analysis, abstracted to a definition of human dignity. Any test of discrimination which asks 
whether the different treatment is reasonable or unreasonable, permissible or impermissible, is another 
way of inquiring whether it is justifiable or not. This is true of Arbour J. 's analysis in Lavoie, but also of 
Mr. Justice Bastarache's conclusion that a citizenship preference for employment is discriminatory and 
subject to section l. The difference between the two is that while he found the classification justifiable 
under section 1, she found it justifiable under section 15, through a negative or exclusionary interpretation 
of human dignity. Justices Arbour and Bastarache were less divided on the question of entitlement and 
whether section 15 is engaged, as on the question whether the preference was suspect and therefore prima 
facie unjustifiable, or unsuspicious and accordingly permissible. 
It would be difficult for a test of breach as complicated as Law's to avoid overlap with section l's 
function of justification. And, as the opinions in Lavoie illustrate, the relationship between sections 15 
and 1 is far from settled. Thus the equality jurisprudence remains a protracted exercise in confusion. It is 
dysfunctional, in large part, because the Court bas refused to respect the functional purposes of breach 
and justification. Until it does, little in section 15's interpretation is likely to change. 
13 Supra note 4. 
14 (2002), 210 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.) . 
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Justification and the other side of the equation 
The Court's decision in Andrews preceded Irwin Toy v. Quebec (A.G.)15 by a few months. At the time, 
Justice La Forest was the only one who was uncomfortable with the decision to give section 15 a 
narrowing interpretation. The underlying assumption of Mcintyre J. 's prohibited grounds methodology 
was that the analytical functions of breach and justification should be more or less in balance. 
Subsequently, and in proposing a definition of freedom of expression, Irwin Toy is a counterpart of 
Andrews. It is interesting to note, in comparing the two guarantees, that the Court agreed to limit the 
scope of section 15, but was Wlable to agree on a methodology until Law, ten years later. Meanwhile, 
Irwin Toy advanced a two part test of expressive freedom. Paradoxically, section 2(b) began under the 
constraints of a structured test of breach but than was granted an open-ended interpret~tion. On the 
entitlement side, the Court was not at all concerned about the balance between the right and its limits. 
Skewing the Charter's equation on the entitlement side did not produce a sound methodology or results 
especially protective of equality. In principle, an approach that accepts the logic of section l and reserves 
the question of limits to that part of the analysis is more protective of rights. But that has not been section 
2(b)'s experience. After adopting a generous interpretation of the right, the Court compensated by easing 
the standard of justification. Its concerns about keeping the equation in equilibrium resulted in corrections 
on the section 1 side: as seen above, the worry was that overextending the Charter's rights and applying a 
strict section 1 test was too dangerous a combination. 
Even so, it can be forgotten, in light of later developments, that I1win Toy's definition of expressive 
freedom is ambivalent. There, a majority of three set up a two-part test to decide the question of breach. 
Step one, which requires an attempt to convey meaning, simply asks whether an activity is expressive in 
nature. The second step trades on Big Ms16 purpose-effects distinction, and is more obscure. Its two-
prong analysis asks first whether the purpose of the restriction is to interfere with the content of the 
expression, in which case a prima facie breach is established and the analysis moves to section 1. 
Alternatively, when the resttiction merely affects expressive freedom, its second part requires the rights 
claimant to show that the activity in question serves the guarantee's underlying values. Only then is a 
section 1 analysis required. 
How the two-step test might widen or narrow the scope of the guarantee was initially unknown. On one 
hand, the majority openly endorsed section 2(b)'s values and declared that the freedom embraced all 
expressive activity, regardless of its content. That, in combination with the first step of the test, which in 
effect asks a question of fact, suggested few constraints on the entitlement. In this, the Cou1t's definition 
was unaffected by concerns about the relationship between sections 2(b) and I. On the other, though, the 
first step included a violent forms exception, and the second required a putpose-effects analysis which not 
only created a double standard but allowed the Court to screen claims. The degree to which screening 
would occur depended on the application of those criteria. 
Irwin Toy also suggested a two-tiered approach to the question of justification. There, the majority 
opinion experimented with a dichotomous conception of Charter rights. When the state acted as the 
singular antagonist of the individual, it stated, a strict standard of justification should apply. But when the 
state served in its capacity to protect the vulnerable or make policy decisions about the allocation of 
resources, the standard should be less exacting. The awkwardness of Irwin Toy, in part, was that the Court 
had extended the Charter's protection to pure commercial expression. Invalidating a law against 
children's advertising, which bad been enacted in the province of Quebec, would expose the Court to 
15 Supra oote 3. 
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criticism. In the circumstances, the purpose of Irwin Toy's dichotomy was to rationalize limits on 
expressive freedom which otherwise would not have survived the Oakes test. 
In the wake of Irwin Toy, section 2(b)'s evolution could be expected to follow two patterns. First, the 
cumulative effect of section 2(b)'s two-step test and the two branches of Oakes would subject expressive 
freedom to an abstract and heavily structured methodology. Second, it appeared that the Oakes test, which 
was complex enough in its own right, might be subdivided into standards that were more or less strict, 
depending on the nature of the state's intervention. 
It was not long before the Court buckled tuider the analytical strain of that methodology. In the event, 
critical developments occurred on each side of the equation. First, it clarified its conception of the right. 
Not only was the violent forms exception read down, the principle of content neutrality was granted near-
absolute status. In addition, the purpose-effects branch of the test effectively withered. Those 
developments left in place a presumption that expression is prima facie valuable, and that violations of 
the freedom must be justified under section 1. 
The second development led to conflict between a near-absolute conception of the rights, and an easy 
standard of justification under section 1. Rather than endorse Irwin Toy's two-tiered approach, the Court 
preserved equilibrium between rights and their limits through the "contextual approach". At the outset, 
context provided a way to balance competing considerations under section 1 and offset a methodology 
which was relentlessly abstract. In addition, and owing to the textual divide, breach and justification were 
disconnected from each other: the nature of the right belonged on one side of the equation, and the 
requirements of a democratic society, on the other. True to the functional and structural logic of the 
Charter, the Oakes test was designed to determine the reasonableness of a Charter violation, and not to 
"balance" rights against democratic prerogatives. By not juxtaposing the competing considerations at 
stake, abstract, compartmentalized conceptions of the right and its limits slanted the analysis in favour of 
the right. 
Contextualizing the contest between the competing interests addressed a perceived gap in the Oakes test 
which could lend an air of reality to the analysis. An objective which made sense nonetheless distorted 
the methodology in section 2(b) cases, because it provided the means by which the guarantee's values 
were turned against the freedom under section 1. Doctrinally, context did not fit either branch of the 
Oakes test. Without a place in the analysis, the concept had nowhere to go and would surely languish. 
Accordingly, in a series of decisions commencing with R. v. Keegstra,11 the Court held that context is an 
aspect of the proportionality analysis. In that setting, context served as a proxy for content that allowed 
the Court to test the value of particular expressive activity against section 2(b)'s abstract values. In that 
way, the contextual approach achieved the opposite of content neutrality: instead of enhancing the 
guarantee, section 2(b )' s values explained why a lower standard of justification applied to objectionable 
expressive activity. 
In the section 2(b) jurisprudence, the separation of rights and their limits became an a1tifice that allowed 
the Court to claim a magnanimous interpretation of section 2(b) and then achieve inconsistent results 
under section 1. By disconnecting the principle of content neutrality from section 1, this methodology 
manipulated the separation of breach and justification. With the textual divide in place, the two parts of 
the equation did not have to be consistent. 
All that said, the section 2(b) jurisprudence is more faithful to the Charter's conceptual scheme than its 
section 15 counterpart. And, though the results have been uneven over the years, the contextual approach 
17 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. 
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has been less focal in recent case law. At present, then, the section 2(b) methodology is more wanting in 
refinement than in need of a make over. 
Comparisons and an anomaly 
Neither Law's approach, which has burdened section 15 with a structured and constraining test of breach, 
nor the contextual approach, which bas emasculated the principle of expressive freedom under section 1, 
offers a workable methodology. The Court's top heavy definition of equality compromises both sides of 
the equation. On one side, the entitlement is subject to complex, subjective criteria which diminish the 
guarantee and apply justificatory criteria to determine whether equality has been violated. On the other, 
the section 1 analysis is eliminated, to the claimant's disadvantage, when different treatment is not 
"discriminatory'' because it does not offend human dignity. Though that allows the government to 
succeed without explaining why it is permissible to treat individuals differently, when a claim does reach 
section 1, the combination of Law and the section 1 analysis creates tremendous odds against its success. 
Meanwhile, under section 2(b), the principle of content neutrality was subverted by the methodology of 
the contextual approach. If the problem with the section 15 jurisprudence is that section 1 criteria entered 
the definition of entitlement, section 2(b) was undercut by the misuse of the guarantee's values under 
section l. 
Whether the Charter's methodology of rights and limits should be the same for different guarantees is a 
question infrequently broached. Though the textual location and function of section 1 support that view, 
the Court's divergent methodologies are not unexplained. For instance, its fear that section 15 might be 
trivialized, and section 1 too heavily taxed led to a methodology that privileges the entitlement side of the 
equation. Meanwhile, the Court's awareness that invalidating criminal sanctions against unpopular 
expression would be controversial led it to subvert expressive freedom's values under section 1. 
A final example illustrates how anomalous this methodology can be. Despite its conceptual and 
geographical proximity to section 2(b ), freedom of association has been given one of the narrowest 
interpretations of all the Charter's guarantees. Thus it is more difficult to establish a breach of section 
2(d) than to satisfy Law's multidimensional test of discrimination. This state of affairs arises from the 
Labour Trilogy's 18 distinction between the freedom to form an association and the freedom to engage in 
collective activities. That distinction was motivated by the fear that labour relations might otherwise be 
constitutionalized by the Charter, as well as by a general concern that groups and organizations, simply 
by virtue of associating, might be granted greater rights than individuals. The Court's resistance to 
associational freedom was embedded in the entitlement to prevent claims from reaching section 1. In the 
result, section 2( d) was confined to the foimal right to associate, and to associational activities which 
were independently protected by other Charter guarantees. 
Until the decision in Dunmore v. Ontario (A.G.), 19 section 2(d) was a dead letter. The equation was so 
distorted on the entitlement side that claims crossed the definitional barrier to section 1 on the rarest of 
occasions only. It bears noting here, too, that the decision to exclude associational activity, generally, 
from the Charter substitutes definitional criteria for the conclusion that limits on collective activity are 
justifiable. As the late Chief Justice Dickson's dissenting opinion in the Trilogy attests, that conclusion rests 
less on any sound conception of association than on the raw fear that section 1 would be swamped and any 
number of laws rendered vulnerable to invalidity. So much activity is collective in nature that, without 
definitional limits, section 2(d) might grant all human endeavow· status under the Charter. 
18 Tue Labour Trilogy comprises Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.}, (1987] l S.C.R. 313; P.S.A.C. v. 
Canada, (1987] 1 S.C.R. 424; and R. W.D.S. U. v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460. 
19 (2002), 207 D.L.R. (4'h) 193 (S.C.C.). 
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In Professional Institute v. Northwest Tenitories,'10 the late Sopinka J. structured the section 2(d) methodology 
in a series of four points which described the relationship between an association and its activities. Though his 
framework arose from the Labour Trilogy, it stated yet too generous a scope for the guarantee and was not 
endorsed by a majority of the Court for several more years21 • More recently, though, in supplementing 
Professional Institute with an inquiry explicitly directed at interferences with collective activity, Dunmore v. 
Ontario (A.G.) diminished the importance of the distinction between a bare right to associate and the freedom 
to engage in collective activities. It is too early to tell how the jurisprndence will evolve under Dunmore. At the 
moment, however, it appears that section 2(d) has taken a step away from the entitlement side, and moved 
toward the justification part of the equation. 
A consistent methodology of breach and justification has never been a priority for the Court. The section 2(b) 
and section 15 jurisprudence is not remotely consistent, and section 2(d)'s entitlement analysis may be more 
akin to section 15's, but that places it in sharp contrast to the low threshold applied under section 2(b). Th.is 
refreshes the question whether divergence is undesirable, and the short answer is that any methodology which 
overextends the entitlement analysis at the expense of section l's function is undesirable. By blurring breach 
and justification that approach renders the Court's decisions conceptually unsound. As shown throughout the 
discussion, it has produced a docllinal structure which is complex and impenetrable. To cope, the Comt has 
introduced subjective concepts which simplify the process of decision making but compromise the goal of a 
principled methodology. Last but not least, how the functions of rights and limits are formulated can affect the 
outcome in cases where a claim fails on breach but might have succeeded had it reached section 1. 
It is time to rethink the methodology of the Charter's equation. Due to the press of time, the proposal below is 
rough and preliminary, a form of thinking in progress. 
A questioll of balance 
Balance is a central Charter concept, and one that has different meanings. For instance, there must be a 
balance between the rights of individuals.and the requirements of democratic governance. In addition, there 
must be a balance, or dialogue, between the courts and legislatures. As well, there is an expectation that 
Charter interpretation should balance the roles breach and justification play, to prevent one side of the 
equation assuming inordinate importance in the analysis. By the same token, it is assumed that each side 
should shoulder an appropriate burden; in other words, the Charter should not unfairly advantage the claimant 
or tbe state in contests between the two. 
Any or all of the relationships above can be in or out of balance. That is a matter of perception on which views 
will vary, depending on whichever vision of rights is favow-ed. In turn, whether explicitly or implicitly, every 
vision of rights includes substantive, institutional and doctrinal elements. One of the shortfalls in the Charter 
jurisprudence to this point is its lack of a vision or conception of rights. In its absence, the Cou1t has balanced 
rights and their limits in a more ad hoc fashion. The Charter's equilibrium is adjusted by manipulating both 
sides of the equation, on an as needed basis, to achieve an acceptable balance between lights and limits. To the 
extent this can be considered a vision, it is not a desirable one. 
20 Supra note 5. 
21 See Professional Institute, ibid.; Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157; and Delisle v. Canada 
(Deputy A.G.), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989. 
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Thls part of the paper does not offer a vision of rights. Instead, it proposes a methodology that can apply, 
whatever the Court's vision of rights may be. It is a methodology that addresses the equation and is 
indifferent to results. As noted in the Introduction, it rests on two premises: first, that limits should be 
imposed under section 1; and, second, that a consistent methodology should apply to all guarantees, with 
only those exceptions that are directed by the text. 
There are at least three reasons why limits should be reserved to section 1. To begin, that is section l's 
structural and analytical function. Second, as the discussion has shown, building limits into the definition 
of entitlement has not worked. Not only are the resulting doctrines confusing and constraining, they 
overlap the question of justification. Third, an equation that reserves the question of limits to one side 
need not be out of equilibrium. All it means is that limits are decided there and not elsewhere. In 
methodological terms, that side is indifferent whether limits under section I are easy or difficult to justify. 
Under this concept of the Charter's functioning the reasoning of Andrews, that definitional limits on the 
entitlement are necessary to preserve the balance, is unsound. 
Second, the divergent methodologies in place at present detract from the Charter's cohesion. As well, 
these methodologies have duplicated, repeated and complicated the analysis. All too often the result is a 
wearying series of exercises in obfuscation. A consistent methodology of rights and limits would simplify 
the Charter's interpretation and contribute to greater transparency in decision making. At the same time, 
it need not rob the guarantees of their context and subject difficult questions about competing 
considerations to a mechanistic formula under section l. 
The structural logic of the Charter can and does work. Suggested below, in preliminary form, is a way of 
reconfiguring the existing guarantee-specific methodologies to restore section l's function and lend 
coherence to the equation of rights and limits. The proposal will be elaborated in the full article this 
conference paper introduces. 
It offers two alternatives, the first of which is preferred and is therefore explained in more detail; the 
second is merely mentioned. To begin. although a low threshold for breach would diminish the 
entitlement side of the equation, the Court need not worry about disequili'brium between rights and their 
limits; under the proposal, section 1 's function would be divided into two parts and enriched by the 
addition of a contextualization analysis. Accordingly, the first part contemplates a contextualization, 
which would characterize the nature of the infringement and, in doing so; infonn the requirements of 
justification, which would be addressed, doctrinally, at the second stage of the analysis. This exercise 
would both rationalize and adjust the requirements of the Oakes test, which would remain in place as the 
foundation for testing reasonable limits. Examples from each of the three guarantees discussed above 
provide an illustration. 
Under section 15, for example, the complexities of the Law test would be eliminated in favour of a simple 
question which would ask whether an individual was treated differently and therefore unequally. 
Adopting a low threshold of breach would not eliminate the Law test, but would shift most of its criteria 
to section l's initial, contextualization analysis. The objective there would be to develop principles which 
explain why some inequalities are more or less justifiable than others. The use of a prohibited ground, for 
instance, invites a demanding standard of justification, because the classification singles individuals out 
on that basis and raises a suspicion, for that reason, that it might be based on stereotyping. At the same 
time, some of the prohibited grounds are more likely to offend human dignity than others; some arise 
from a stronger history of discrunination than others. Whether and how that ought to affect the 
application of Oakes should be part of the section 1 analysis, and not a screening mechanism to prevent 
violations of equality from requiring an explanation. Meanwhile, there would be a presumption that 
different treatment not based on a prohibited ground is justifiable. Only where the government cannot 
satisfy a relatively low standard of rationality or proportionality would that presumption be rebutted. 
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The analysis in section 2(b) cases has already gravitated to section 1, and so the challenge there is one of 
formalizing the principles which should inform justification. Once again, the Court could develop 
principles under the contextual analysis, to explain why the standard of justification is not the same in 
every case. Content regulation, absolute bans and prior restraints pose the most serious threats to 
expressive freedom, and the standard of justification that applies in such instances should accordingly be 
strict. In addition, section 2(b)'s underlying values can inform the question of justification, but rather than 
test the content of particular expression against general values, the Court can identify which categories of 
expression are located closer to the core of the guarantee. That political expression is highly prized is 
hardly controversial, and should be reflected in the form the Oakes test takes. Finally, the Court should be 
more explicit that it is the harm of an activity, not its perceived lack of value, that is the measure of a 
justifiable limit. 
A parallel can be drawn with claims under section 2(d). Once again, singling an organization out because 
of its objectives, as well as absolutely banning either its activities or its operations, should invite rigorous 
scrutiny. As well, it is not inappropriate to apply a different standard of justification to a political 
organization than to one formed for criminal purposes. Finally, the contextualization of section 2(d) 
claims should include a presumption against measures which are based on guilt by association. 
The point of commencing the section 1 analysis with a contextualization of the infringement is to 
rationalize and regulate the Oakes standard of justification. Adding this exercise to section 1 will allow 
the Court to contextualize the justification to the individual guarantees. Also, it will identify the criteria 
which explain adjustments to the Oakes test. Not only can it lead to a more evenhanded application of the 
test, under identified criteria, it is flexible enough to maintain equilibrium between the rights and their 
limits, wherever the Court decides that point may be. 
A second alternative, mentioned briefly here, is this. Another way of addressing the divide between rights 
and their limits is to merge the concepts. That could be done by reading section 1, notionally, into the 
guarantees, and conducting an integrated analysis. Doing so would encourage a simplification of the 
entitlement analysis and thereby demonstrate that the present jurisprudence attaches far too much 
importance to that question. Being atextual, this approach is less desirable. Still, it has the advantage of 
bringing the entitlement directly into contact with its limits. As argued throughout this paper, the 
disconnection of these concepts has been a stumbling block in the Charter's interpretation thus far. At the 
same time, attaching section 1 to every guarantee, on even a notional basis, might detract from its status 
as the Charter's organizing principle. As well, though it is not unavoidable, conducting an integrated 
analysis could cause confusion on the burden of proof. 
Conclusion 
Charter interpretation requires a methodology which makes some sense of the text's separation of rights 
and their limits. Section l's innovation, which was conceptually sound in the sense of putting any notion 
of absolute rights to rest and seeking continuity with a tradition of parliamentary democracy, has 
generated a difficult jurisprudence. ParadoxicaUy, the functions of breach and justification have been 
disconnected from each other, and yet the two overlap in the case law. The result, as repeated far too often 
throughout this paper, is needless confusion, complication and incoherence in the Court's management of 
these concepts. 
In defining the relationship between the rights and their limits at the outset, the Supreme Court of Canada 
could not have been expected to foresee and predict how the two concepts would interact. Initial choices 
favouring the protection of rights on both sides of the equation led to further choices aimed at its re-
calibration. Still uncertain today, the two sides of the equation have each become dysfunctional. 
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The object of this article has been to propose a methodology which will redefine the equation's functions 
of rights and limits. In doing so, it coIUlects the Charter's two central functions in a way that has been 
missing from the beginning. Because it is based on the principle that a low threshold for breach should 
reserve the question of reasonable limits to section 1, it is likely to encounter resistance. Two quick points 
in its favour can be made. The fust is that adjusting the roles on both sides of the equation need not upset 
the Charter' s equilibrium. The justification analysis does not presume that rights should prevail over 
limits, or that limits should prevail over rights. The basis of the proposal, instead, is that the introduction 
of a contextualization exercise can refine and enrich the section 1 analysis. Only then can section 1 fulfill 
its intended role, without generating undue fears that rights are too adequately or inadequately protected, 
or that the courts are too powerful or not powerful enough. 
Second, the changes proposed here do not require the Court to abandon its own jurisprudence. As 
suggested above, it is more a question of shifting existing criteria into a contextualization exercise under 
section 1, re-shaping those criteria and perhaps adding others, and specifying a set of principled 
guidelines for the justification analysis under Oakes. 
The stmctural and functional logic of the Charter's equation can and does work. But it requires a 
methodology which respects that logic to make it work. 
